A plain-language guide to divorce in New York from Goldberg Sager & Associates in Brooklyn.
Written by Karen Goldberg Sager, Partner, Goldberg Sager & Associates
Legally reviewed by Karen Goldberg Sager, J.D., New York Law School; admitted to the New York Bar, 1988; Member, Brooklyn Bar Association Family Court Committee. Last updated October 3, 2026.
Attorney Advertising. This guide is general legal information for New York residents. It is not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Before you act on anything here, talk to a licensed New York attorney about your own facts.
To discuss a divorce or family law matter with Goldberg Sager & Associates, call 718-645-6677 or contact our Brooklyn office at 1628 Kings Highway.
In New York, only the Supreme Court can end a marriage. If you or your spouse lives in Brooklyn, that court is the Kings County Supreme Court at 360 Adams Street. The same case decides property, maintenance, custody, and child support under the Domestic Relations Law.
I head the family law practice at Goldberg Sager & Associates. Our firm has represented matrimonial clients from its office at 1628 Kings Highway, in the Midwood section of Brooklyn, since 1992. I earned my law degree from New York Law School in 1986 and was admitted to practice in New York in 1988. I serve on the Brooklyn Bar Association’s Family Court Committee, which reviews family law statutes and procedure and the work of the Kings County courts. My cases include contested and uncontested divorces, legal separations, annulments, prenuptial and postnuptial agreements, custody and visitation, child support and spousal support, orders of protection, and interstate matters under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.
This guide is written the way I explain New York divorce to a client across the desk. Each Part states the rule, names the statute, explains the words in plain terms, and then applies the rule to a hypothetical. The hypotheticals use fictional names and facts. None describes a real client or a real case.
At a first meeting I ask three questions before anything else. When did you and your spouse last live together? What does each of you own and owe? Where are the children living now? The answers usually settle the ground for the divorce, the date that separates marital property from separate property, and the starting point for custody. This guide follows the same order.
Most guides to New York divorce explain the statutes and stop. This one adds the Brooklyn layer: which courthouse hears the case, how its Matrimonial Office and Help Center work, and the questions that come up in a borough where most households rent and more than a third of residents were born outside the United States.
Only the Supreme Court can grant a divorce. Family Court decides custody, visitation, child support, spousal support, and family offense cases, but it cannot end a marriage. A divorce begins when one spouse, the plaintiff, buys an index number from the County Clerk, files a summons, and has it served on the other spouse, the defendant. The automatic orders in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(2)(b) bind the plaintiff at filing and the defendant at service. They hold the finances still. If the spouses agree on every issue, the case is uncontested and is usually decided on the papers, with no court appearance. If they disagree on anything, the case is contested: each spouse files a sworn statement of net worth, the court holds a preliminary conference, the spouses exchange financial records, and the case settles or goes to trial. One judgment ends the marriage and decides property, maintenance, custody, and child support. Part II follows each step as it works in Brooklyn.
If you need representation now rather than background, our Brooklyn divorce attorneys handle both contested and uncontested cases.
The law is the same in every county. The courthouse, the caseload, and the housing market are not. Brooklyn divorces are heard by the Kings County Supreme Court, Civil Term, at 360 Adams Street, which describes itself as the busiest civil term in New York State. Its Matrimonial Office on the tenth floor schedules preliminary conferences, processes uncontested divorces, and receives emergency applications. Its Help Center in Room 123 runs the court system’s Uncontested Divorce DIY Program for people without lawyers. Part II explains how to use both.
Housing shapes Brooklyn divorces in a way the statutes do not spell out. According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2020-2024 American Community Survey estimates for Kings County, only 29.5 percent of housing units are owner-occupied. Roughly seven in ten Brooklyn households rent. The median gross rent is $1,833 a month, and the median value of an owner-occupied home is $905,000. For most couples, the question of who stays in the home is a question about a lease, not a deed. Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(f) lets the court decide the use and occupancy of the marital home without regard to who holds title, so a rented apartment is within the court’s reach. Part III explains how.
Brooklyn is also a borough of immigrants: 35.3 percent of Kings County residents were born outside the United States. When a spouse or child has ties to another state or country, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act decide which court may act. And where a member of the clergy performed the marriage, Domestic Relations Law § 253 requires the spouse seeking the divorce to swear that he or she has taken all steps within his or her power to remove any religious barrier to the other spouse’s remarriage. Part VI covers these Brooklyn-specific issues.
Two changes matter for anyone starting a divorce in 2026. First, Chapter 673 of the Laws of 2025, signed on December 19, 2025, amended Domestic Relations Law § 170(5) and § 170(6). A spouse who has lived apart under a judgment of separation or a written separation agreement may now sue for divorce after six months rather than one year. The act took effect sixty days after signing, about February 17, 2026, and applies to divorce cases filed on or after that date. The three time-based routes to divorce, under § 170(5), § 170(6), and § 170(7), now share the same six-month period. Second, on March 1, 2026, the New York courts published the 2026 adjustments to the support and maintenance figures. The combined parental income cap for child support rose from $183,000 to $193,000. The income cap for the maintenance formula rose from $228,000 to $241,000. The self-support reserve, which protects a low-income payor, is $21,546 for 2026. The revised court forms took effect the same day. Parts IV and V explain each figure where it applies.
Each Part opens with a short answer to its central question, then explains the rule, names the statute, and applies it to a hypothetical. Figures appear in tables only when an official source current as of the last-updated date supports them. A set of frequently asked questions closes Part VII. Where a question comes up outside a divorce, such as custody or support between unmarried parents or an order of protection, the same standards apply in Family Court, and our Brooklyn family law attorneys handle those matters as well. Nothing here replaces advice about your own facts. When you are ready to discuss them, call 718-645-6677.
Yes, if two conditions are met: at least one spouse satisfies a residency test in Domestic Relations Law § 230, and the case fits one of the seven grounds in § 170. The no-fault ground requires only that one spouse swear the marriage has been irretrievably broken for at least six months. The other spouse’s consent is not required.
New York does not grant a divorce because a couple asks for one. The complaint must state a ground, and Domestic Relations Law § 170 lists the seven that exist. The first four are fault grounds, which require proof that one spouse did something the statute condemns. The fifth and sixth convert an existing separation into a divorce after six months apart. The seventh is the no-fault ground. The table states each ground as the statute defines it.
| Subdivision | Ground | What the statute requires |
|---|---|---|
| § 170(1) | Cruel and inhuman treatment | Conduct by the defendant that so endangers the plaintiff’s physical or mental well-being that it is unsafe or improper for the plaintiff to continue living with the defendant |
| § 170(2) | Abandonment | Abandonment of the plaintiff by the defendant for one year or more |
| § 170(3) | Imprisonment | Confinement of the defendant in prison for three or more consecutive years after the marriage |
| § 170(4) | Adultery | A voluntary sexual act by the defendant with a person other than the plaintiff after the marriage, as the statute defines it |
| § 170(5) | Living apart under a judgment of separation | Six months or more apart after the judgment, and proof that the plaintiff substantially performed its terms |
| § 170(6) | Living apart under a written separation agreement | An agreement signed by both spouses and acknowledged in the form required to record a deed, filed with the county clerk; six months or more apart after signing; and proof that the plaintiff substantially performed its terms |
| § 170(7) | Irretrievable breakdown (no-fault) | The relationship has broken down irretrievably for at least six months, stated under oath by one spouse; no judgment until property, support, fees, custody, and visitation are resolved |
Which ground you plead rarely changes the money. The sixteen factors in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d) do not ask who caused the marriage to fail. They do ask about domestic violence, which Part III covers. Adultery also has defenses, listed in Domestic Relations Law § 171, so the ground can fail even when the act is proved. Most people plead fault only when the facts are undisputed, or when they have a particular reason to.
Clients often arrive at a first meeting ready to prove adultery or abandonment, expecting the proof to change the division of property. It does not. A fault ground can get you a longer and more expensive case, because the other spouse can deny it and force a trial.
One spouse’s sworn statement is enough. Domestic Relations Law § 170(7) does not define “irretrievably,” does not require the other spouse to agree, and does not require the spouses to live apart during the six months. New York added this ground effective October 12, 2010, according to the court system’s uncontested divorce instructions. It is the ground used in most uncontested filings.
The second sentence of § 170(7) controls timing. No judgment may be granted on this ground until equitable distribution, spousal support, child support, counsel and expert fees, and custody and visitation have been settled by agreement or decided by the court and written into the judgment. The end of the marriage is rarely in dispute. The terms are. A contested divorce in New York today is almost always a fight about money or children, not about whether the marriage will end.
Not the divorce itself. Section 170(7) needs one sworn statement, not two signatures. A spouse who will not sign, will not participate, or disagrees that the marriage is over cannot keep the court from ending it. That spouse can fight the terms: property, maintenance, where the children live, how much support is owed. Those fights take time, and the judgment waits for them. The marriage does not.
Subdivisions (5) and (6) of Domestic Relations Law § 170 allow a divorce after the spouses have lived apart under a judgment of separation or a written separation agreement. Until 2026 the required period was one year. Chapter 673 of the Laws of 2025, signed on December 19, 2025, cut it to six months or more. The act took effect sixty days later, about February 17, 2026, and applies to cases filed on or after that date. The same act added a no-fault ground to the separation statute, Domestic Relations Law § 200, so a judgment of separation may now also rest on an irretrievable breakdown of six months.
The separation-agreement route under § 170(6) has formal requirements that are easy to miss. The agreement must be in writing and signed by both spouses. The signatures must be acknowledged or proved in the form required to record a deed, which in practice means before a notary. The agreement, or a short memorandum of it listing the parties’ names and addresses, the date of the marriage, and the dates of the agreement and its acknowledgment, must be filed with the county clerk where either spouse lives. The spouses must then live apart for six months or more after signing, and the plaintiff must show substantial performance of the agreement’s terms. An agreement that misses a step does not support a divorce under § 170(6). It may still be enforceable as a contract.
Two further points apply in Brooklyn. First, where a member of the clergy performed the marriage, Domestic Relations Law § 253 requires sworn statements that each spouse has taken all steps within his or her power to remove any religious barrier to the other’s remarriage, and in an uncontested divorce under § 170(5) or (6) both spouses must file them. Part VI explains why this matters here. Second, couples choose the separation-agreement route most often when they want binding terms in place before any divorce is filed, or when they are not ready to divorce for personal or religious reasons. The agreement does the work. The later divorce confirms what they already decided. Our page on legal separation in New York describes the process.
Someone does, and for long enough. Domestic Relations Law § 230 permits a New York divorce only when one of five residency tests is met. The tests turn on where the couple married, where they lived as spouses, where the ground arose, and how long one or both spouses have lived in the state.
| Test | What § 230 requires |
|---|---|
| 1 | The spouses were married in New York, and either spouse is a resident when the action begins and has been one for a continuous year before it |
| 2 | The spouses lived in New York as a married couple, and either spouse is a resident when the action begins and has been one for a continuous year before it |
| 3 | The ground for divorce arose in New York, and either spouse has been a resident for a continuous year before the action begins |
| 4 | The ground for divorce arose in New York, and both spouses are residents when the action begins |
| 5 | Either spouse has been a resident for a continuous period of at least two years before the action begins |
The two-year test is the simplest because it asks nothing about the marriage. The one-year tests require a New York connection: the wedding, the couple’s shared home, or the events behind the ground. Only one spouse needs to qualify. Domestic Relations Law § 231 adds that a married person who lives in New York when the action begins is treated as a resident even if the other spouse lives elsewhere. A spouse who leaves the state does not take New York’s jurisdiction along.
Residency is a different question from where to file. Once § 230 is met, the case is filed in the Supreme Court of the county where either spouse lives. For a spouse in Brooklyn, that is the Kings County Supreme Court. Part II describes the filing.
There are three, and each leaves the marriage in a different legal state.
A legal separation keeps the marriage intact while the spouses live apart under written terms. It can come from a separation agreement that meets the requirements of § 170(6), or from a judgment in an action for separation under Domestic Relations Law § 200, which the statute describes as separating the parties “from bed and board.” Neither form permits remarriage. Either can be converted into a divorce after six months under § 170(5) or (6). Our article on how a legal separation works in New York compares the two forms.
An annulment treats the marriage as invalid from the start. Domestic Relations Law § 140 limits it to specific grounds: a prior spouse was still living when the marriage took place; a spouse was under the age of consent; a spouse lacked the mental capacity to consent; a spouse has an incurable physical incapacity, where the action is brought within five years of the marriage; consent was obtained by force, duress, or fraud; or a spouse has had an incurable mental illness for five years. Annulments are uncommon because most marriages that fail were valid when made. Even in an annulment, the court may still decide maintenance and property, because Domestic Relations Law § 236 applies to any matrimonial action.
Family Court can decide custody, visitation, child support, spousal support, and orders of protection without any divorce being filed. It cannot end the marriage. Spouses who need an enforceable support or custody order quickly, but are not ready to divorce, often begin there.
This example is illustrative. The names and facts are fictional, and it does not describe a real case.
Dana and Luis were married in Brooklyn in 2016. Dana has lived in Midwood since 2012. Luis moved to New Jersey in January 2026. They have one child, age seven, who lives with Dana. In October 2026, Dana decides to divorce.
Dana meets two residency tests at once. The spouses were married in New York and she has lived here for more than a year, which satisfies § 230(1), and she has lived here for more than two years, which satisfies § 230(5). Luis’s move does not matter. Under § 231, Dana is a New York resident regardless of where he lives.
Dana and Luis never signed a separation agreement, so § 170(6) is unavailable. Dana files under § 170(7), stating under oath that the marriage has been irretrievably broken since at least March 2026, more than six months before filing. Luis objects. His objection does not stop the divorce. It does mean the judgment waits until custody, child support, and the division of their property are resolved, by agreement or by the court.
Now change one fact. Suppose Dana and Luis had signed a separation agreement before a notary on March 10, 2026, filed it with the Kings County Clerk, and lived apart since. Under § 170(6) as amended by Chapter 673, Dana could file on that agreement any time after September 10, 2026, provided she had substantially performed its terms. Under the old one-year rule, she would have waited until March 2027. Because a rabbi performed their marriage, each would also file the sworn statement about barriers to remarriage that § 253 requires in an uncontested case under § 170(6).
The ground a plaintiff pleads decides what must be proved, how the other spouse can respond, and when the case can end. Our overview of the types of divorce in New York explains how uncontested and contested cases differ once the ground is chosen. Part II follows the filing through the Brooklyn courthouse.
A Brooklyn divorce begins when one spouse buys a $210 index number from the Kings County Clerk at 360 Adams Street and files a summons. From there the case is either uncontested, decided on papers submitted to the Matrimonial Office, or contested, with financial disclosure, a preliminary conference, and settlement or trial before a matrimonial judge.
Every Brooklyn divorce is filed in the Kings County Supreme Court, Civil Term, at 360 Adams Street, Brooklyn, New York 11201. Three offices in that building touch the case. They are not interchangeable.
The County Clerk’s office issues the index number, accepts the filed papers, and keeps the record. Divorce files are not public. Under Domestic Relations Law § 235, the County Clerk releases papers other than the judgment only to the spouses or their attorneys.
The Matrimonial Office, on the tenth floor south, schedules preliminary conferences, reviews and processes uncontested divorce papers, and receives emergency applications. Its counter is open from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on court days. The phone is 347-296-1714.
The Office of the Self-Represented, in Room 123, helps people without lawyers and runs the court system’s Uncontested Divorce DIY Program. The court’s web page lists Monday through Thursday, 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.; its July 2024 rules list a midday closing. Call 347-296-1740 before you go.
Contested cases are assigned to one of the court’s matrimonial parts, each with its own motion and conference days. The court also has an Integrated Domestic Violence Part, where one judge hears a family’s related matrimonial, family, and criminal matters. Papers may be filed electronically through the state’s NYSCEF system. Self-represented spouses are not required to e-file, but the court encourages it.
An uncontested divorce is one in which the defendant does not oppose the divorce or any of its terms, either by signing a consent or by not responding. The court system’s uncontested divorce overview describes the sequence. In Kings County it runs as follows.
Use only the forms marked “Rev. 3/1/26.” The court revised the whole packet on that date for the six-month separation periods under Chapter 673 and the 2026 support and maintenance figures. In our experience, the most common cause of delay in an uncontested Brooklyn divorce is not the court. It is a packet returned for a missing form or an outdated version.
Court fees are fixed by statute and are the same in every county. The figures below come from the court system’s uncontested divorce fee schedule, current as of March 1, 2026. Attorney’s fees are separate; Part VII discusses them.
| Item | Fee | When it is paid |
|---|---|---|
| Index number | $210 | When the summons is filed |
| Request for Judicial Intervention and Note of Issue | $125 combined ($95 for the RJI and $30 for the Note of Issue when they are filed at different times) | With the judgment packet in an uncontested case; the RJI is filed earlier in a contested case |
| Each motion | $45 | When the motion is filed |
| Filing a settlement agreement | $35 | When the agreement is filed |
| Certified copy of the judgment | $8 each | After the judgment is signed |
| Minimum court fees for an uncontested divorce | $335 | Across the case |
A spouse who cannot afford the fees may apply for poor person relief. In the Kings County matrimonial parts, that application, like applications for substituted service and address confidentiality, is made ex parte with a no-fee RJI and without notice to the other spouse, under the Kings County matrimonial rules.
The automatic orders in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(2)(b) take effect in every divorce without a judge signing anything. They bind the plaintiff when the summons is filed and the defendant when it is served. They last until the judgment is entered or the case is dismissed, discontinued, or stayed, unless the court or a written and acknowledged agreement between the spouses changes them.
While they are in force, neither spouse may transfer, sell, encumber, conceal, or dispose of property without the other’s written consent or a court order, except in the usual course of business, for ordinary household expenses, or for reasonable attorney’s fees in the divorce. Neither may withdraw or borrow from retirement accounts or apply for retirement benefits, although a spouse already receiving benefits may keep receiving them. Neither may run up unreasonable debt, including new borrowing against the home or unreasonable use of credit cards. Neither may drop the other spouse or the children from medical, hospital, or dental insurance, and existing coverage must be maintained. Neither may change life insurance beneficiaries, and life, automobile, homeowners, and renters policies must be kept in force. Each spouse must give the other written notice within ten days of any notice of a tax lien, foreclosure, bankruptcy, or lawsuit affecting marital property.
The orders run forward from filing. They do not reach a transfer made the week before. That conduct is dealt with through the property factors in Part III, so a spouse who learns of it should raise it at once.
The statement of net worth is a sworn, itemized disclosure of each spouse’s income, expenses, assets, and liabilities, on a form prescribed by the court. Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(4)(a) makes financial disclosure compulsory in every contested divorce. The statement is due within 20 days of a written demand or, if no one demands it, within 10 days after the pleadings are complete. It must attach a current pay stub and the most recent federal and state returns with W-2 forms. It must list every transfer of assets, made in any manner, within the three years before filing or the length of the marriage, whichever is shorter, other than routine business exchanges of about equal value. In Kings County, pleadings and statements of net worth are filed with the assigned part ten days before the preliminary conference, with each attorney’s retainer statement and the parties’ recent pay stubs or W-2 and 1099 forms.
In our office, no client discusses a settlement number before the statement of net worth is complete. The statement is sworn and filed with the court, and every later claim about income, support, or property is measured against it. A number offered before it is finished is a guess, and a guess made under oath is a problem.
A contested divorce follows a schedule set by the Uniform Rules for the Trial Courts and the Kings County matrimonial rules.
Within 45 days of serving the summons, a party files the Request for Judicial Intervention, which assigns the case to a matrimonial judge. The court must then hold a preliminary conference within 45 days of the RJI. In Kings County the preliminary conference is in person, both spouses and their attorneys must attend, and adjournments are limited. At the conference the court takes up requests for temporary relief, including interim counsel fees, sets a timetable for financial disclosure, and schedules the compliance conference and the pre-trial conference. Where there is a child under eighteen, a statutory records check form is due before the conference.
Kings County also runs a presumptive mediation program. Cases involving parenting time, custody, child support, or equitable distribution may be screened and referred to one mandatory 90-minute session with a court-roster mediator, at no cost to the spouses. Screening excludes cases where mediation would be unsafe or unfair, including those with orders of protection or a power imbalance, and either party may opt out by filing a form at the preliminary conference. What is said in mediation is confidential and cannot be used in the case.
After disclosure, the compliance conference confirms that both sides have produced what was ordered. Before the pre-trial conference, the Note of Issue is filed and each spouse provides a statement of proposed disposition, an updated statement of net worth, a maintenance guidelines calculation, a child support worksheet where applicable, and the last three years of tax returns. A case may settle at any point. A signed stipulation of settlement is reviewed by the court and incorporated into the judgment. If the case does not settle, it is tried before the assigned justice or a referee. Proposed judgments must be submitted for signature within 60 days under section 202.48 of the Uniform Rules.
Two Kings County practices matter for anyone in immediate danger. A request for a temporary order of protection is made by order to show cause, without notice to the other spouse, and the rules provide that it is heard within 24 hours of filing and, when possible, the same day. Our page on orders of protection describes what the order can require.
No statute sets a timetable, and the Kings County Supreme Court does not publish one. The time a case takes is the sum of fixed periods and variable ones. The fixed periods are short: up to 120 days to serve the defendant, 40 days for a default, 45 days to file the RJI in a contested case, and 45 more for the preliminary conference. The variable periods control. In an uncontested case, the variable is how quickly the spouses complete and sign the papers and how long the Matrimonial Office takes to review the packet. In a contested case, it is how long financial disclosure takes and whether the spouses settle before trial. Our firm’s page on uncontested divorce describes six to nine months as a common range for cooperative couples. That is our experience with the Brooklyn court, not a rule. A contested case with disputed custody or a business to value can take considerably longer, and no responsible attorney will promise a date.
The names and facts are fictional.
Priya and Daniel live in Flatbush and have one child, age nine. They agree to divorce and have resolved custody, support, and the division of their savings. On November 3, 2026, Priya buys an index number from the Kings County Clerk for $210 and files a Summons With Notice. Because they have a child under 21, she uses the paper packet rather than the online program. On November 10, a friend of Priya’s hands Daniel the summons, the Automatic Orders, the § 255 health-insurance notice, and the Notice of Guideline Maintenance. Daniel signs the Affirmation of Defendant before a notary on November 20.
Priya and Daniel sign a written settlement agreement covering custody, a parenting schedule, child support under the guidelines, and the division of their accounts. Priya files the agreement with a $35 fee, then files the Note of Issue and RJI with a $125 fee and the judgment packet, including the child support worksheet, Form UCS-111, Form DOH-2168, and, because a priest performed their wedding, Form UD-4. Their court fees total $370, plus $8 for each certified copy of the judgment. The Matrimonial Office reviews the packet, a justice signs the judgment, and Priya serves a copy on Daniel. Neither of them appears in court.
Now change one fact. Daniel serves an Answer disputing the parenting schedule. The case is now contested. Priya’s attorney files the RJI within 45 days of service, and the court schedules an in-person preliminary conference within 45 days after that. Both spouses attend. The court screens the case for the mediation program and refers it to a 90-minute session, where they agree on a schedule. Their stipulation is incorporated into the judgment, and the case ends without a trial.
Whether a case is uncontested or contested is not fixed at filing. It depends on the defendant’s response and can change in either direction. Our overview of contested divorce in Brooklyn explains what changes when it does, and our article on the first steps in obtaining a New York divorce covers what to gather before filing. Part III turns to the question most clients ask first: how property and debt are divided.
New York divides marital property fairly, not automatically in half. Domestic Relations Law § 236(B) defines marital property as nearly everything either spouse acquired during the marriage, regardless of title, and lists sixteen factors the court must weigh in dividing it. Separate property, meaning what each spouse brought in, inherited, or received for personal injuries, stays with its owner.
The first job in every property case is sorting. Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(1)(c) defines marital property as all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before a separation agreement is signed or a divorce action is started, regardless of the form in which title is held. Section 236(B)(1)(d) carves out four kinds of separate property. Section 236(B)(5)(b) adds a short rule: separate property shall remain such.
| Category | Statute | What it includes |
|---|---|---|
| Marital property | § 236(B)(1)(c) | All property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before a separation agreement is signed or a divorce action is started, regardless of whose name is on the title |
| Separate property: pre-marital, inherited, and gifted | § 236(B)(1)(d)(1) | Property acquired before the marriage, and property received during the marriage by bequest, devise, descent, or gift from anyone other than the spouse |
| Separate property: injury compensation | § 236(B)(1)(d)(2) | Compensation for personal injuries |
| Separate property: exchanges and appreciation | § 236(B)(1)(d)(3) | Property acquired in exchange for separate property, and the increase in value of separate property, except to the extent the increase is due in part to the other spouse’s contributions or efforts |
| Separate property: by agreement | § 236(B)(1)(d)(4) | Property described as separate in a written agreement that meets the requirements of § 236(B)(3) |
Title does not matter. A bank account, a car, or a co-op in one spouse’s name is marital property if it was acquired during the marriage with marital earnings. The filing date is the cutoff. Property acquired after the case begins is not marital, which is why the filing date is one of the three facts I ask about at a first meeting. Separate property can lose its character at the edges. Under § 236(B)(1)(d)(3), growth in a separate asset stays separate only to the extent the other spouse’s efforts did not cause it. In Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8 (1986), the Court of Appeals held that appreciation attributable to the other spouse’s direct or indirect contributions, including work as a homemaker and parent, is marital property, while appreciation from market forces alone stays separate. Courts have also treated separate funds deposited into a joint account as marital unless the owner can trace them. A spouse who wants to preserve an inheritance should keep it in a separate account from the day it arrives. Our page on protecting an inheritance during divorce explains how.
The personal-injury exception matters in a borough with Brooklyn’s traffic. Compensation for personal injuries is separate property by statute. A spouse who recovers for a car accident or a fall during the marriage keeps that recovery. What the recovery covers is a question our personal injury attorneys settle before any settlement is signed.
Section 236(B)(5)(c) states the standard in one sentence: marital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. Equitable means fair, not equal. Section 236(B)(5)(d) lists the factors the court must consider:
Under § 236(B)(5)(g), the court must state the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision, and neither spouse nor their lawyers can waive that. A property division in New York is a reasoned decision, not an announcement. Under § 236(B)(5)(e), where dividing an asset in kind would be impractical or burdensome, or where dividing an interest in a business or profession would be contrary to law, the court makes a distributive award instead: a payment of money or other property that achieves the same equity.
Factor seven has a history. In O’Brien v. O’Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576 (1985), the Court of Appeals held that a medical license earned during the marriage was itself marital property to be valued and divided. A 2015 amendment to § 236(B)(5)(d)(7) ended that rule. The court may no longer treat the value of a spouse’s enhanced earning capacity from a license, degree, celebrity goodwill, or career enhancement as marital property. It must still consider the other spouse’s direct and indirect contributions to that earning capacity when it divides the property that does exist. The spouse who supported a partner through residency or graduate school still has a remedy. It is now a larger share of the marital estate, not a share of the degree.
In our experience, long marriages in Brooklyn usually end near an equal division, and departures from equality come from the factors: most often a separate-property contribution to a specific asset, wasteful dissipation, or domestic violence. The sixteen factors are not a scorecard. They are the vocabulary in which a court explains why one division is fairer than another.
For most Brooklyn couples the question is who keeps the apartment, not who gets the house. Only 29.5 percent of Kings County housing units are owner-occupied, according to the Census Bureau’s 2020-2024 estimates, and the median rent is $1,833 a month.
The statute treats owners and renters the same way as between the spouses. Section 236(B)(5)(f) lets the court order the use and occupancy of the marital home and its household effects, as provided in Domestic Relations Law § 234, without regard to the form of ownership. Factor three tells the court to weigh a custodial parent’s need to stay in the home. The court can therefore award exclusive occupancy of a rented apartment to one spouse during and after the divorce. The order binds the two spouses. It does not bind the landlord. Whether the remaining spouse can stay on the lease is a separate question, and renters should raise it with counsel early rather than after judgment.
Where the home is owned, three outcomes are common. The home is sold and the net proceeds divided. One spouse buys out the other’s share, often by offsetting it against retirement assets or a distributive award. Or the sale is deferred, typically until the youngest child finishes school, with the custodial parent living there in the meantime. A co-op adds a step, because transferring the shares and proprietary lease to one spouse generally requires the cooperative’s approval. With a median owner-occupied value of $905,000 in Kings County, the home is often the largest item in the marital estate. A spouse who put pre-marital or inherited money into the purchase should expect the court to consider a credit for that separate contribution before the balance is divided.
Retirement benefits earned during the marriage are marital property even though they will not be paid for years. The Court of Appeals settled this in Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481 (1984): pension rights earned between the date of the marriage and the start of the divorce are marital property subject to equitable distribution. The portion earned before the marriage, and the portion earned after the divorce is filed, stay the employee’s separate property.
The mechanics depend on the plan. A 401(k) or similar account is divided by balance. Contributions made and growth earned during the marriage are marital. A balance that existed on the wedding day, and the passive growth on it, is separate under § 236(B)(1)(d)(3) if it can be traced. A traditional pension is divided by formula, usually by giving the non-employee spouse a share of each payment proportional to the years of marriage during which the pension was earned. Private employer plans may be divided only through a court order the plan administrator accepts as a qualified domestic relations order, because federal law under ERISA permits assignment of retirement interests only by such an order. Public pension systems, including those covering New York City and New York State employees, have their own order requirements. In every case the transfer is made through the plan by court order, not by one spouse withdrawing funds, and the automatic orders described in Part II forbid withdrawals while the case is pending. Our page on dividing a 401(k) in divorce covers the common mistakes.
The Domestic Relations Law does not define marital debt as its own category. Courts generally treat debts incurred during the marriage for the family’s benefit as part of the marital estate and allocate them under the same sixteen factors. As with assets, the name on the account does not control. What matters is when the debt was incurred and what it was for.
Two rules limit arguments about past spending. In Mahoney-Buntzman v. Buntzman, 12 N.Y.3d 415 (2009), the Court of Appeals refused to let a wife recoup marital funds her husband had spent during the marriage on maintenance to a prior spouse and on his own student loans. Courts apply the same idea to ordinary marital spending: absent fraud, concealment, or waste, it is not re-audited at divorce. The exceptions are factors twelve and thirteen, wasteful dissipation and transfers made in contemplation of a divorce without fair consideration. Money lost to gambling, spent on an affair, or moved to a relative the month before filing is charged against the spouse who spent or moved it. Once the case begins, the automatic orders bar either spouse from running up unreasonable new debt.
Financial disclosure in a New York divorce is compulsory, and the tools for finding hidden assets are in the statute. Section 236(B)(4)(a) requires each spouse to serve a sworn statement of net worth listing all income and assets of whatsoever kind and nature and wherever situated, with every transfer of assets made within the preceding three years or the length of the marriage, whichever is shorter. Noncompliance is punishable under section 3126 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, which lets the court resolve disputed issues against the party who withheld information. Beyond the statement, the ordinary tools of litigation apply: document demands, subpoenas to banks and employers, depositions, and, where the amounts justify it, a forensic accountant. Section 236(B)(4)(b) lets the court set the valuation date for each asset anywhere between commencement and trial, which limits the benefit of moving assets around after filing.
In our experience, the tax return is the first place to look. Income reported to the Internal Revenue Service has to come from somewhere, and an account that pays interest or dividends is hard to hide from a return that reports them. Our page on uncovering hidden assets describes what else we look for.
Yes. Section 236(B)(5)(a) directs the court to divide property except where the parties have provided for it in an agreement. Section 236(B)(3) sets the requirements, whether the agreement was made before or during the marriage: it must be in writing, signed by both spouses, and acknowledged or proven in the form required to record a deed. It may provide for the ownership and division of separate and marital property; for the amount and duration of maintenance, provided those terms were fair and reasonable when made and are not unconscionable when the judgment is entered; and for the care of children, subject to the court’s authority under Domestic Relations Law § 240. An agreement that meets these requirements replaces the sixteen factors with the couple’s own terms. Our page on prenuptial and postnuptial agreements explains what the agreement should cover.
The names and facts are fictional.
Marisol and Theo married in 2012 and live in a Kensington co-op they bought in 2015 for $500,000. Theo paid the $100,000 down payment from savings he had before the marriage. Marisol’s 401(k) held $40,000 on their wedding day and holds $300,000 when she files for divorce in 2026. Theo inherited $80,000 from his mother in 2018 and kept it in an account in his name alone. Marisol received a $50,000 settlement for a 2021 car accident. The couple owes $20,000 on a joint credit card used for household expenses, and Theo lost $15,000 gambling in 2025.
The co-op is marital property because it was acquired during the marriage, even though Theo’s name appears first on the stock certificate. His $100,000 down payment came from separate property, and the court may credit him for it before dividing the equity, under § 236(B)(1)(d)(3) and factor seven. Marisol’s 401(k) is partly separate and partly marital: the $40,000 pre-marital balance and its passive growth stay hers if she can trace them, while contributions and growth during the marriage are divided through a qualified domestic relations order. Theo’s inheritance is separate under § 236(B)(1)(d)(1), and because he never commingled it, it stays his. Marisol’s injury settlement is separate under § 236(B)(1)(d)(2). The credit card balance is marital debt and is allocated between them. Theo’s gambling losses are wasteful dissipation under factor twelve, and the court may charge the $15,000 against his share. The judgment must state the factors the court relied on and why.
Sorting property into marital and separate is the step every later number depends on, and the step most often done carelessly. Our Brooklyn attorneys handle the division of marital property in contested and uncontested cases. Part IV turns to the second financial question in most divorces: whether one spouse will pay maintenance to the other, and for how long.
Spousal maintenance in New York is calculated by a statutory formula, not by negotiation alone. Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6) applies the formula to the paying spouse’s income up to $241,000 as of March 1, 2026, sets an advisory schedule for how long payments last, and lists the factors a court must weigh before departing from either.
Maintenance is New York’s word for what other states call alimony: periodic payments from one spouse to the other, during the divorce and after it, to close the gap between their incomes. Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(1)(a) defines it as payments at fixed intervals for a definite or indefinite period, under a valid agreement or a court award. The payor is the spouse with the higher income. The payee is the spouse with the lower income. Gender plays no part. The higher earner pays.
New York has two kinds of maintenance, in two parallel subdivisions of the statute. Temporary maintenance, under § 236(B)(5-a), is paid while the divorce is pending and ends no later than the judgment. Post-divorce maintenance, under § 236(B)(6), is set in the judgment and runs for the period the court or the spouses’ agreement fixes. Both use the same two formulas and the same cap. They differ mainly in duration and in the list of factors that justify a departure.
The formula starts with income. For maintenance, income is defined by reference to the Child Support Standards Act, which Part V explains, with two adjustments: maintenance paid to the other spouse in the same case is not subtracted, and for post-divorce maintenance the court also counts income from property distributed in the divorce. The formula then applies to the payor’s income up to a cap. The statute sets the cap at $184,000 and tells the Office of Court Administration to adjust it for inflation every two years, starting March 1, 2020. As of March 1, 2026, the cap is $241,000, as the court system’s Notice of Guideline Maintenance states.
Which formula applies depends on whether child support will also be paid, and by whom.
| Situation | Step one | Step two | Guideline amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| The payor will also pay child support as the non-custodial parent | 20 percent of the payor’s income minus 25 percent of the payee’s income | 40 percent of the spouses’ combined income minus the payee’s income | The lower of step one and step two; zero if the result is zero or less |
| No child support will be paid, or the payor is the custodial parent | 30 percent of the payor’s income minus 20 percent of the payee’s income | 40 percent of the spouses’ combined income minus the payee’s income | The lower of step one and step two; zero if the result is zero or less |
Two rules sit on top of the arithmetic. First, the self-support reserve protects a low-income payor. If the guideline amount would leave the payor below the reserve for a single person, which is $21,546 for 2026, the guideline amount becomes the difference between the payor’s income and the reserve. If the payor is already below the reserve, there is a rebuttable presumption of no maintenance. Second, maintenance is calculated before child support. Under § 236(B)(6)(c)(1)(g), the maintenance figure is subtracted from the payor’s income and added to the payee’s income before the child support percentages are applied. The two calculations are linked, and maintenance comes first.
In our office, the maintenance formula is the first calculation we run in any case with a real income gap, before property is discussed, because every later number depends on it.
The formula stops at the cap. The court’s authority does not. Under § 236(B)(6)(d), the court applies the formula to the first $241,000 of the payor’s income and then decides, in its discretion, whether to award more on the income above the cap. It must consider the factors in § 236(B)(6)(e) and must state its reasons in writing or on the record. For high earners, the income above the cap is where most of the argument happens, and the result turns on the factors rather than on a percentage. Part VI discusses those cases.
The guideline amount is presumptive, not mandatory. Section 236(B)(6)(e)(1) lets the court adjust it where the guideline result would be unjust or inappropriate, after considering one or more of fifteen listed factors:
When the court departs from the guideline, § 236(B)(6)(e)(2) requires it to state, in writing or on the record, the unadjusted guideline amount, the factors it considered, and the reasons for the adjustment. That requirement cannot be waived. Where a spouse is unrepresented, § 236(B)(6)(g) bars the court from entering a maintenance order until it has told that spouse the guideline amount. Spouses may agree to a different figure in a written agreement that meets § 236(B)(3), and most do. The formula is then the reference point against which the agreement is measured.
Duration follows an advisory schedule in § 236(B)(6)(f)(1), keyed to the length of the marriage, which the statute measures from the wedding to the date the divorce action was commenced.
| Length of the marriage | Duration of maintenance, as a percentage of the marriage’s length |
|---|---|
| Up to and including 15 years | 15 percent to 30 percent |
| More than 15 years, up to and including 20 years | 30 percent to 40 percent |
| More than 20 years | 35 percent to 50 percent |
The schedule is advisory. Whether or not the court uses it, § 236(B)(6)(f)(2) requires the court to consider the deviation factors and state them on the record, and the statute preserves the court’s power to award non-durational maintenance in an appropriate case. Section 236(B)(6)(f)(4) adds a retirement rule: the court must consider the anticipated retirement assets, benefits, and retirement age of both spouses where they can be determined, and where they cannot, the payor’s later actual retirement with a substantial loss of income is a basis for modification.
Whatever the duration, post-divorce maintenance ends under § 236(B)(6)(f)(3) on the death of either spouse or on the payee’s remarriage, valid or invalid. Domestic Relations Law § 248 adds a cohabitation rule: on proof that the payee is habitually living with another person and holding himself or herself out as that person’s spouse, the court may annul the maintenance provisions. Living together alone is not enough; the statute requires both elements. Separately, § 236(B)(8)(a) lets the court order the payor to keep life insurance naming the payee as beneficiary for the life of the obligation, and to keep health insurance for the payee for the same period.
Yes, within limits. Under § 236(B)(9)(b)(1), a court may modify a maintenance award made after trial on a showing of the payee’s inability to be self-supporting, a substantial change in circumstances including financial hardship, or the payor’s actual full or partial retirement where it substantially changes the finances. The bar is higher when the maintenance term comes from the spouses’ own agreement: no modification without a showing of extreme hardship on either party. Arrears already reduced to a judgment cannot be cut, and other arrears generally cannot be changed retroactively unless the party in default shows good cause for not asking sooner.
The tax treatment of maintenance changed in 2019, and New York and the federal government now follow different rules. For divorce or separation agreements executed after December 31, 2018, federal law no longer lets the payor deduct maintenance, and the payee does not report it as income. New York did not follow that change. Under New York Tax Law § 612(w), as reflected in the state’s instructions for Form IT-225, the payor subtracts maintenance paid from New York adjusted gross income (subtraction code S-136) and the payee adds maintenance received (addition code A-119). A Brooklyn spouse who pays maintenance gets no federal deduction but does get a state one. A spouse who receives it owes no federal tax on it but does owe New York tax. Tax consequences are among the factors a court must weigh, and the gap between the two systems is one reason the guideline figure is rarely the end of the conversation. Our partner Marcel A. Sager, who holds a Master of Laws in Taxation from New York University School of Law, reviews the tax effects of proposed maintenance and property terms before our clients sign them.
The names and facts are fictional.
Renata and Omar were married for twelve years when Renata filed for divorce in Kings County. Renata earns $120,000 a year. Omar earns $40,000. They have no children. Renata is the payor because her income is higher.
Because no child support will be paid, the second formula applies. Step one: 30 percent of $120,000 is $36,000, and 20 percent of $40,000 is $8,000, leaving $28,000. Step two: 40 percent of their combined $160,000 is $64,000, and subtracting Omar’s $40,000 leaves $24,000. The guideline amount is the lower figure, $24,000 a year, or $2,000 a month. Paying it leaves Renata with $96,000, well above the self-support reserve, so no adjustment is needed. A twelve-year marriage falls in the first band of the advisory schedule, so the guideline duration is 15 to 30 percent of twelve years, roughly 22 to 43 months. The court picks a point in that range after weighing the factors and states its reasons.
Now change the facts. Suppose Renata and Omar have a child who lives primarily with Omar, so Renata will also pay child support. The first formula applies. Step one: 20 percent of $120,000 is $24,000, and 25 percent of $40,000 is $10,000, leaving $14,000. Step two is still $24,000. The guideline maintenance is now $14,000 a year, and child support is then calculated on Renata’s income of $106,000 and Omar’s income of $54,000, as Part V shows.
Finally, suppose Renata earns $300,000 rather than $120,000, with no children. The formula applies only to the first $241,000 of her income: 30 percent of $241,000 is $72,300, less $8,000, leaves $64,300; 40 percent of $281,000 is $112,400, less $40,000, leaves $72,400; the guideline amount is $64,300 a year. Whether Omar receives anything on the $59,000 above the cap is for the court to decide under the factors, with reasons on the record.
Maintenance questions usually arrive with urgency, because the lower-earning spouse often needs an order before the case ends. Temporary maintenance exists for that purpose. Our page on spousal support in a Brooklyn divorce explains how the application is made. To discuss temporary support while a case is pending, call 718-645-6677. Part V turns to the children: custody, parenting time, relocation, and child support.
Custody in New York is decided by the child’s best interests, with no preference for either parent, under Domestic Relations Law § 240. Child support follows a formula: a fixed percentage of the parents’ combined income up to $193,000, divided in proportion to their incomes, and payable until the child turns 21.
Custody is decided by the child’s best interests. Neither parent starts ahead. Domestic Relations Law § 240(1)(a) directs the court to enter custody orders “as, in the court’s discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the child,” and adds that in all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent. Mothers do not start ahead. Fathers do not. Neither does the parent who files first.
The statute does not list the factors. The Court of Appeals filled them in with Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167 (1982): custody turns on the totality of the circumstances, and no single factor controls. The cases that follow Eschbach weigh who has been the child’s primary caregiver, how stable each home is, each parent’s fitness and ability to guide the child’s emotional and intellectual development, the child’s wishes in light of the child’s age and maturity, the value of keeping siblings together, and whether each parent will support the child’s relationship with the other. The court may interview the child privately in chambers. In Kings County that interview is in person, and the court’s rules direct that children not be brought to the courthouse unless the court has ordered one. The court may appoint an attorney for the child and, under § 240(1)(a-3), a forensic evaluator, who must be a New York-licensed psychologist, social worker, or psychiatrist with current training certification.
Two Kings County practices shape every contested custody case. Before any custody or visitation order, § 240(1)(a-1) requires the court to review the statewide registry of orders of protection, the sex offender registry, child-protective proceedings, and outstanding warrants; the Kings County rules require the registry check form before the preliminary conference in any case with a child under eighteen. And as Part II explained, Kings County screens custody disputes for its mediation program, where many parenting schedules are settled in the first ninety-minute session.
They describe different things, and an order can assign them differently. Legal custody is the authority to make major decisions about the child’s education, health care, and religious upbringing. Physical custody, also called residential custody, is where the child primarily lives. Parenting time, which the statute still calls visitation, is the schedule of time the child spends with each parent. Each can be sole or joint. Joint legal custody, in which both parents share decisions, is common when parents can communicate. In Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584 (1978), the Court of Appeals held that joint custody fits relatively stable, amicable parents and should not be imposed on parents who cannot cooperate. A parent without physical custody ordinarily has a set schedule of parenting time, and § 240(1)(a) also permits reasonable visitation for grandparents.
In our experience, the schedule that lasts is the one built around the parents’ actual work hours, the child’s school day, and the travel time between two Brooklyn homes, not a template. Our pages on child custody and parenting time and visitation describe the arrangements courts commonly approve.
Domestic violence is not one factor among many. Under § 240(1)(a), where a party alleges in a sworn pleading that the other party committed domestic violence against the party or a family or household member, and the allegation is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the court must consider the effect of that violence on the child’s best interests and must say on the record how it factored into the decision. Where abuse of the child is proved, the court may not place the child with a parent who presents a substantial risk of harm. The statute also protects a parent who makes a good-faith allegation based on a reasonable belief supported by facts: that parent may not lose custody or contact solely for the belief or for reasonable steps taken to protect the child. Section 240(3) lets the court issue an order of protection inside the divorce, and that order may remain in effect after the judgment, during the child’s minority. Part VI covers orders of protection in detail.
A further change is pending. Kyra’s Law, Senate Bill S5998-C, passed the Senate on June 4, 2026 and the Assembly on June 5, 2026, both unanimously. As of October 3, 2026, the Governor had not signed or vetoed it, and it is not law. If signed, it takes effect 270 days later. It would require a prompt evidentiary hearing whenever a party or the child’s attorney raises facially credible allegations of a substantial risk to the child’s safety, create a rebuttable presumption against unsupervised custody or visitation for a party found to pose that risk, define coercive control in the Domestic Relations Law for the first time, and require training for judges who hear these cases. Parents with safety concerns should ask their attorney about the bill’s status, because it would change the order in which a custody case proceeds.
Not without the other parent’s consent or the court’s permission, where a custody order or the other parent’s parenting time would be affected. The governing decision is Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727 (1996). The Court of Appeals rejected rigid tests and held that each relocation request is decided on its own facts, with the child’s best interests predominant. The court weighs each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the child’s relationship with each parent, the effect of the move on the quantity and quality of the child’s future contact with the parent left behind, how much the move would improve the moving parent’s and the child’s lives economically, emotionally, and educationally, and whether a suitable schedule can preserve the child’s relationship with the other parent. A move from Brooklyn to another borough rarely raises these questions. A move to another state or country always does. Our page on relocating with a child explains how the request is made.
A New York court may decide custody only if it has jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, which New York enacted as Article 5-A of the Domestic Relations Law. The central rule is the home-state rule. Under Domestic Relations Law § 75-a, a child’s home state is the state where the child lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the custody case began; for a child under six months, it is the state where the child has lived since birth. New York courts may make an initial custody decision when New York is the home state, and a case filed too soon after a move is dismissed. Interstate child support is governed by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, which New York has adopted in its Family Court Act, and international abduction cases by the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. These questions come up regularly in a borough where more than a third of residents were born outside the United States, and I have handled matters under both uniform acts for many years. The first question in any such case is where the child has actually lived for the past six months.
New York calculates child support under the Child Support Standards Act, in Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b). The court determines each parent’s income, applies a percentage to the parents’ combined income, and divides the result in proportion to their incomes. These are the figures that apply as of March 1, 2026.
| Element | Figure (effective March 1, 2026) |
|---|---|
| Child support percentage, one child | 17 percent of combined parental income |
| Two children | 25 percent |
| Three children | 29 percent |
| Four children | 31 percent |
| Five or more children | No less than 35 percent |
| Combined parental income to which the percentage must be applied | $193,000 |
| Self-support reserve (135 percent of the federal poverty guideline for one person) | $21,546 |
| Federal poverty income guideline for one person | $15,960 |
| Minimum order where the paying parent’s income is below the poverty guideline | $25 per month |
| Minimum order where income is above the poverty guideline but below the self-support reserve | $50 per month, or the difference between income and the reserve, whichever is greater |
Income has a specific meaning under § 240(1-b)(b)(5). It starts with gross income as reported, or as it should have been reported, on the most recent federal tax return. It adds investment income, workers’ compensation, disability, unemployment, Social Security, veterans’ benefits, pensions, fellowships, annuities, and maintenance received from the other spouse. The court may also impute income from assets that produce none, from employment perks such as housing or a car, from money or services provided by relatives, and from a parent’s former earnings where the court finds the parent cut income to avoid support. From that total the statute deducts unreimbursed employee business expenses, maintenance paid to the other spouse under the order, child support paid for other children, public assistance, Supplemental Security Income, New York City or Yonkers income taxes actually paid, and FICA taxes actually paid.
The percentage applies to combined parental income up to the cap, which the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance publishes each March on its Child Support Standards Chart. Where combined income is above $193,000, § 240(1-b)(c)(3) leaves the excess to the court, which may apply the percentage, the deviation factors, or both, and must explain its reasoning. The paying parent, called the non-custodial parent, pays his or her share of the basic obligation to the custodial parent, who is presumed to spend his or her own share directly on the child.
The basic obligation is not the whole order. Section 240(1-b)(c) adds several items, each divided between the parents in proportion to their incomes. Reasonable child care costs incurred because the custodial parent works, or attends school or training that will lead to work, must be added. The cost of the child’s health insurance must be allocated, and § 240(1) requires any parent with available coverage to enroll the child; coverage is presumed reasonable in cost if the child’s share of the premium does not exceed five percent of the parents’ combined gross income. Unreimbursed health care expenses must be prorated, with the paying parent’s percentage stated in the order. The court may also award educational expenses, including private school and college, where it finds them appropriate.
The formula is presumptive, not absolute. Under § 240(1-b)(f), the court may depart from it only after finding the result unjust or inappropriate based on the listed factors: the financial resources of the parents and the child; the child’s physical and emotional health and special needs; the standard of living the child would have had if the household had stayed intact; tax consequences; the parents’ non-monetary contributions; the educational needs of either parent; a substantial disparity between the parents’ incomes; the needs of the paying parent’s other children; and extraordinary expenses of exercising parenting time. A court that departs must set out the presumptive amount, the factors, and its reasons in a written order, and that requirement cannot be waived. Parents who settle must do the same: § 240(1-b)(h) requires any agreement to state that the parents were advised of the Child Support Standards Act, to state what the presumptive amount would have been, and to explain any deviation. Where a parent is unrepresented, the court may not enter a support order unless that parent has received a copy of the chart.
Two more rules govern how support is paid and what it does not depend on. Under § 240(2), the court issues an income deduction order with the support order, so payments are withheld from the paying parent’s wages unless the court finds good cause not to or the parents agree on another arrangement; the custodial parent may also elect collection through the Support Collection Unit. And under § 236(B)(7)(a), the court shall not consider the misconduct of either party in setting child support. Child support belongs to the child. It does not rise or fall with the reasons for the divorce.
Child support is owed for an unemancipated child under the age of twenty-one. Nothing in the statute ends it at eighteen or at high school graduation. It continues past twenty-one in one situation: Domestic Relations Law § 240-d, enacted in 2021, permits a support order until age twenty-six for an adult child with a developmental disability, as defined in the Mental Hygiene Law, who lives with the parent seeking support and depends principally on that parent.
An order can be modified. Under § 236(B)(9)(b)(2), the court may modify child support on a substantial change in circumstances and, unless the parents opted out in a written agreement, also where three years have passed since the order was entered or last modified, or where either parent’s gross income has changed by fifteen percent or more. A drop in income counts only if it was involuntary and the parent has looked diligently for comparable work. Arrears that accrued before the application was filed cannot be reduced. Our page on child support describes how initial and modified orders are calculated.
The names and facts are fictional.
Return to Renata and Omar from Part IV, in the version where their eleven-year-old child lives primarily with Omar in Midwood. Renata earns $120,000 and will pay Omar $14,000 a year in maintenance. Omar earns $40,000. Because maintenance is calculated first, it moves between their incomes before child support is set. For this example, assume that after subtracting the FICA and New York City income taxes each actually pays, and after moving the $14,000 from Renata’s income to Omar’s, Renata’s income for child support purposes is $92,500 and Omar’s is $49,700.
Their combined parental income is $142,200, below the $193,000 cap, so the percentage applies to all of it. For one child, 17 percent of $142,200 is $24,174, the basic child support obligation. Renata’s share of combined income is 65 percent, so her presumptive obligation is about $15,725 a year, roughly $1,310 a month, payable to Omar. Omar’s 35 percent share is presumed to be spent directly on the child. Because Omar works and pays $12,000 a year for after-school care, Renata also pays 65 percent of that cost, about $7,800 a year. If Omar carries the child on his employer’s health plan, Renata pays 65 percent of the child’s share of the premium, and 65 percent of any medical or dental expenses the plan does not cover. The order must state her percentage. Because her income reflects a maintenance deduction, it must also say how support will be recalculated when maintenance ends.
Now suppose Renata’s income were $220,000, making combined income about $242,000. The percentage would apply to the first $193,000, and the court would decide whether, and how, to apply it to the remaining $49,000, stating its reasons.
Custody and support are the issues parents most often settle on their own, and the issues an agreement most needs to get right, because the court will enforce it for a decade or more. Part VI turns to the situations that take a Brooklyn divorce off the ordinary path: the religious divorce, domestic violence, large estates and businesses, same-sex marriages, and cases that cross borders.
Some Brooklyn divorces turn on rules most guides leave out: the statute that requires spouses to remove religious barriers to remarriage, the court’s power to issue orders of protection inside the divorce, the valuation of a business or a large estate, the equal treatment of same-sex marriages, and the jurisdiction rules for families with ties to other states or countries.
A judgment of divorce ends the civil marriage. It does not end a religious one. In Jewish law the marriage ends only when the husband gives, and the wife accepts, a bill of divorce, the Get, before a rabbinical court. A spouse with a civil divorce and no Get cannot remarry in the faith. The spouse who withholds the Get has real leverage. In Brooklyn, with its large observant Jewish communities, this issue is part of many cases, and New York is one of the few states with a statute aimed at it.
Domestic Relations Law § 253 applies only to marriages performed by a member of the clergy, not to civil ceremonies at the City Clerk’s office. Under subdivisions two and three, a plaintiff whose marriage was performed by clergy must allege in the verified complaint, and then confirm in a sworn statement filed before judgment, that he or she has taken all steps solely within his or her power to remove any barrier to the defendant’s remarriage, or that the defendant has waived the requirement in writing. No final judgment may be entered without that statement. In an uncontested divorce based on a separation judgment or agreement under § 170(5) or (6), subdivision four requires both spouses to file one. The Kings County Matrimonial Office lists the form, the Sworn Statement of Removal of Barriers to Remarriage (UD-4), on its checklist for every uncontested case.
Subdivision six defines a barrier to remarriage as any religious or conscientious restraint, imposed under the principles of the clergy member who performed the marriage, that results from the other party’s commission or withholding of a voluntary act. The limits matter in practice. A party need not consult clergy to find out whether a barrier exists. A restraint that cannot be removed by the party’s own voluntary act is not a barrier. Taking “all steps” does not include applying to a religious tribunal that annuls marriages, so the statute does not require a Catholic spouse to seek a church annulment. If removal costs money and the other spouse refuses reasonable reimbursement, there is no barrier. Under subdivision seven, a sworn certification by the officiating clergy member that the plaintiff has not taken the required steps blocks the judgment. A knowingly false statement is a crime under subdivision eight. Subdivision nine draws the constitutional line: no court may inquire into or decide a religious question, and the truth of the statements is not subject to judicial inquiry except in a prosecution for a false one.
The statute’s second tool is financial. Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(h) directs the court, where appropriate, to consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage on the property-division factors, and § 236(B)(6)(o) does the same for post-divorce maintenance. A court cannot order a spouse to give a Get. It can weigh the refusal when it divides the marital estate and sets support.
The third source of law is the couple’s own agreement. In Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108 (1983), the Court of Appeals held that a provision in a ketubah, the Jewish marriage contract, by which the spouses agreed to appear before a rabbinical court, could be enforced by a civil court under neutral principles of contract law, without reference to religious doctrine. Religious prenuptial agreements that commit the spouses to religious arbitration are drafted with that decision in mind. The line runs the other way as well. In T.I. v. R.I., decided March 11, 2026 on appeal from the Kings County Supreme Court, the couple had married in a rabbi’s ceremony and signed a ketubah but never obtained a marriage license, and a beth din later declared the ketubah void. The Appellate Division held the civil marriage valid anyway. Under Domestic Relations Law § 25, a marriage solemnized by clergy is not void for lack of a license, and the beth din’s declaration did not dissolve it. Only the Supreme Court can do that.
In our Midwood practice, we raise the Get at the first meeting rather than at the end. The sworn statements must be filed before judgment, and an unresolved religious divorce can hold up everything else.
If you are in immediate danger, call 911. The legal tools described here are for after safety has been secured.
A spouse in a Brooklyn divorce does not need a separate court for protection. Under Domestic Relations Law §§ 240(3) and 252, the Supreme Court may issue an order of protection as part of the divorce. The order may direct a party to stay away from the home, school, or workplace of the other spouse or the children; to refrain from committing any family offense or crime against them; to permit the other parent’s court-ordered time with the children; to allow a protected party to enter the residence at a set time to remove belongings; to return identification documents such as passports, immigration papers, and bank cards; to refrain from harming a companion animal; and, under a 2020 amendment, to refrain from remotely controlling connected devices in the protected party’s home or car. The order may remain in effect after the judgment, during the children’s minority. When it issues the order, the court must address the suspension of any firearms license and the surrender of firearms, and it may authorize the protected spouse to terminate a lease under section 227-c of the Real Property Law. Under § 240(3)(g), a party who seeks a temporary order of protection while the court is open may file that day and is entitled to a hearing the same day or the next court day. The Kings County rules add that ex parte requests are heard within 24 hours of filing, when possible the same day, by order to show cause, and that the Matrimonial Clerk’s office must be told the application includes such a request.
The borough offers two further settings. Family Court hears family offense proceedings and can issue orders of protection with no divorce pending. The Kings County Supreme Court’s Integrated Domestic Violence Part lets one judge hear a family’s related matrimonial, family, and criminal matters together. Applications for address confidentiality in the matrimonial parts are made ex parte with a no-fee RJI.
Domestic violence also enters the financial and custody decisions. It is factor fourteen in equitable distribution (Part III). Conduct that inhibits a spouse’s earning capacity is a ground for departing from the maintenance formula (Part IV). The custody rules in § 240(1)(a), and the pending Kyra’s Law, are explained in Part V. Where safety and custody intersect, the case needs particular care. Our page on high-conflict custody cases describes how those cases are prepared.
Brooklyn also has a resource lawyers cannot replace. The Brooklyn Family Justice Center, at 350 Jay Street, 14th Floor, a short walk from the courthouse, offers free and confidential help to survivors of domestic and gender-based violence, Monday through Friday from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., with no appointment needed. Its services include safety planning, counseling, and civil and criminal legal assistance, with interpreters on site. Callers can reach it through 311. The city’s 24-hour Hope Hotline is 1-800-621-HOPE (4673).
The statutes do not change. The questions do. In a high-income divorce the formulas stop at the caps, which in 2026 are $241,000 of payor income for maintenance and $193,000 of combined parental income for child support, and the court decides the amounts above them in its discretion, with reasons on the record. The maintenance factors include the standard of living during the marriage and the income from property the court distributes, so the two sides of the case are connected. In our experience, the dispute in these cases is rarely about the formula. It is about income: what counts, what was deferred, and what the business actually earns.
A business or professional practice raises three problems that § 236(B)(5) anticipates. The first is valuation, which factor ten acknowledges may be impossible or difficult; the parties usually retain forensic accountants, and the court sets the valuation date under § 236(B)(4)(b). The second is separate property. A business founded before the marriage is separate, but under Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8 (1986), its growth during the marriage is marital to the extent it came from either spouse’s efforts, including the indirect contributions of the spouse who ran the household. The third is division. Factor ten also tells the court to weigh the desirability of keeping a business intact and free from the other spouse’s claims, and § 236(B)(5)(e) permits a distributive award, a payment of money or other property, instead of a share of the business itself. Former spouses are rarely ordered to stay in business together. Our pages on high-net-worth divorce and protecting a business in divorce describe the documents these cases require.
In law, no. New York’s Marriage Equality Act of 2011 added Domestic Relations Law § 10-a, which provides that a marriage that is otherwise valid is valid regardless of whether the parties are of the same or different sex, that no legal right, benefit, or responsibility relating to marriage may differ on that basis, and that gender-specific terms in any law are read neutrally. The United States Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges extended recognition nationwide. Every rule in this guide, from grounds and residency to property, maintenance, custody, and support, applies the same way.
Two practical issues recur. First, many same-sex couples lived together for years before they could legally marry. The statutory definition of marital property starts at the date of the marriage, and courts have generally applied it as written. The years before are addressed, if at all, through the equitable distribution factors or a written agreement under § 236(B)(3). Second, where only one spouse is a child’s biological or adoptive parent, the other spouse’s legal parentage should be confirmed, by adoption or a judgment of parentage, so that custody and support rights do not depend on argument later. A child born during the marriage is presumed to be the child of both spouses, but a presumption is not a judgment. Our page on same-sex divorce addresses both issues.
Part I covered the residency tests, and Part V the home-state rule for custody and the uniform acts for interstate support. Several other rules apply when a spouse, a child, or property is elsewhere. A spouse outside New York may be served by a New York resident or by anyone authorized to serve papers where the papers are served, and a spouse who cannot be found may be served by alternative means with the court’s permission, on application to the Supreme Court Clerk’s office. Under § 236(B)(2)(a), the Supreme Court may declare a foreign divorce valid or void and may award maintenance or divide marital property after a foreign judgment that did not address them. Property abroad is marital property if it was acquired during the marriage, and the statement of net worth must list assets “wherever situated.” Because a New York court cannot transfer title to land in another country directly, it usually balances foreign holdings against assets within its reach. A spouse whose immigration status depends on the marriage should consult immigration counsel before any filing. The Kings County courts provide interpreters, with requests due ten days before the preliminary conference, and the Office of Court Administration must translate orders of protection into the languages most frequently used in the courts of the department.
The names and facts are fictional.
Rivka and Dov were married by a rabbi in Borough Park in 2014 and signed a ketubah that included an agreement to appear before a named beth din. In 2026, Rivka files for divorce in Kings County under § 170(7). Because clergy performed the marriage, § 253 applies. Her verified complaint alleges that she has taken or will take all steps within her power to remove any barrier to Dov’s remarriage, and before judgment she files the UD-4 sworn statement. Dov contests the case and refuses to give Rivka a Get.
The Supreme Court cannot order Dov to give a Get. Section 253(9) forbids any inquiry into religious questions, and because the case is contested, § 253 requires a sworn statement only from Rivka as plaintiff. Rivka has two civil remedies. Under Avitzur, she may ask the court to enforce the ketubah’s agreement to appear before the beth din as a matter of contract law. And under § 236(B)(5)(h) and (6)(o), the court must, where appropriate, consider the effect of the barrier Dov maintains when it divides their property and decides maintenance. If Dov goes to the beth din and delivers the Get, the barrier is gone, and the money is decided on the other factors alone.
The situations in this Part have one thing in common. Each adds a layer of law on top of the ordinary rules, and the layer is easy to miss until it is too late to plan for it. Part VII closes the guide with the practical questions: how to work with your attorney, what a divorce costs in fees, what to do after the judgment, and the questions we are asked most often.
Hiring a divorce attorney in New York follows rules the court imposes on the lawyer, not the client: a written retainer, a Statement of Client’s Rights, and itemized bills at least every 60 days. After the judgment, four tasks remain: enforcing or modifying the terms, restoring a former name, securing health insurance, and rewriting the estate plan.
New York regulates the relationship between a matrimonial client and the lawyer more closely than almost any other area of practice. The rules are in Part 1400 of the court system’s regulations. They apply to every attorney who charges a fee in a divorce, separation, custody, or support matter.
Before you sign anything, the attorney must give you a Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities, in a form prescribed by the Appellate Divisions, at the first meeting. You and the attorney then sign a written retainer agreement that sets out, in plain language, the nature of the relationship and the fee arrangement: the hourly rates, the amount of the advance retainer, how fees are determined if the attorney withdraws or is discharged, and the fact that any unused part of the advance retainer is refunded. Any change in rates requires a signed written amendment. The agreement must provide for itemized bills at least every 60 days, and the attorney may not charge for time spent discussing a bill. A nonrefundable retainer is prohibited. The signed retainer is filed with the court along with your statement of net worth, and an attorney may take a security interest in your property only under conditions the rules specify. If a fee dispute arises, you may arbitrate it through the court system’s fee dispute resolution program. And as the Kings County rules note, representation after the judgment requires a new retainer agreement, even with the same attorney.
Two statutes address the imbalance that often exists between spouses. Under Domestic Relations Law § 237, the court may direct either spouse to pay counsel fees and expert fees directly to the other spouse’s attorney, so that spouse can carry on or defend the case. The statute creates a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse, directs that awards be made on a timely basis while the case is pending so both spouses are represented from the start, and defines expenses to include accountants, appraisers, actuaries, and investigators. Section 238 extends the same presumption to proceedings to enforce or modify a judgment. A spouse who earns far less than the other is not expected to litigate without counsel.
What a divorce costs depends on time, and time depends on dispute. Court fees are fixed and modest: at least $335 for an uncontested divorce, as Part II explained. Attorney’s fees are hourly and rise with the number of contested issues, the need for experts, and the length of discovery. The least expensive divorce is the one in which both spouses arrive at the first meeting with their documents in order. Bring the last three years of tax returns, recent pay stubs, statements for every bank, brokerage, retirement, and credit account, the deed or lease for your home, insurance policies, any prenuptial or postnuptial agreement, and any existing court orders. Those documents answer the three questions I ask first, and they are the raw material of the statement of net worth. In our office, every new client receives the Statement of Client’s Rights before fees are discussed, as the rules require, and we explain that the retainer is a deposit against hourly work, not a flat price for the case.
The judgment ends the marriage on the day it is signed and entered by the County Clerk. Some consequences follow on their own. Others require action.
A former name may be resumed without any further proceeding. Domestic Relations Law § 240-a requires every judgment of divorce or annulment to contain a provision that each party may resume the use of his or her premarriage surname or any other former surname. A certified copy of the judgment, available from the County Clerk for $8, is the document the Social Security Administration, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the passport office will ask to see.
Health insurance needs attention before the judgment, not after. Under Domestic Relations Law § 255, the court may not sign a judgment of divorce until it has ensured that both spouses were notified that, once the judgment is signed, a party may or may not be eligible to stay on the other party’s health insurance plan, depending on the plan’s terms. Any settlement agreement must contain a provision about health coverage, either providing for each spouse’s future coverage or stating that each spouse understands that coverage under the other’s plan will end and that continuation coverage may be available through a COBRA option. The automatic orders that preserved coverage during the case end at judgment. Where maintenance is awarded, § 236(B)(8)(a) lets the court order the paying spouse to maintain health insurance for the other for the life of the obligation.
The estate plan changes by operation of law, but not completely. Under Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 5-1.4, a divorce or annulment revokes any revocable disposition to a former spouse made by will, by revocable trust, by a bank account in trust form, by transfer-on-death registration, by life insurance beneficiary designation, and, to the extent permitted by law, by a retirement plan designation. It also revokes the former spouse’s nomination as executor, trustee, guardian, or agent under a power of attorney. The former spouse is treated as having died first. Three limits make a new estate plan necessary anyway. First, the revocation takes effect only at judgment. While the case is pending, the automatic orders forbid changing life insurance beneficiaries, and a spouse who dies before judgment leaves a spouse who still inherits. Second, the phrase “to the extent permitted by law” is there because federal law governs many employer retirement plans. In Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001), the United States Supreme Court held that federal law can require such a plan to pay the beneficiary named on its form regardless of a state revocation statute. The only safe course is to file a new designation with every plan. Third, where the agreement or judgment requires a former spouse to remain a beneficiary, for example on life insurance that secures maintenance or child support, the designation must be deliberately re-made after the judgment. A new will, health care proxy, and power of attorney complete the task. Our probate and estate planning practice prepares these documents for our divorce clients, and in a Brooklyn co-op or house, the deed and the shares often need attention at the same time.
A judgment of divorce is enforceable by every tool the Civil Practice Law and Rules gives any judgment, and by several the Domestic Relations Law adds. Under § 236(B)(9)(a), maintenance, distributive awards, and child support may be collected by income execution directly from the paying spouse’s wages, and where a spouse fails to pay, the court must, after notice and a hearing, require security or order the sequestration and sale of assets, together with attorney’s fees. Under § 240(2), child support is ordinarily paid by income deduction order from the start. Willful non-payment may be punished as contempt under Domestic Relations Law § 245. Divorce files stay confidential after the case ends. Under Domestic Relations Law § 235, the County Clerk releases papers other than the judgment only to the parties or their attorneys.
Modification follows the rules described in Parts IV and V. Maintenance may be modified under § 236(B)(9)(b)(1) for the payee’s inability to be self-supporting, a substantial change in circumstances including financial hardship, or the payor’s actual retirement, and only for extreme hardship where the terms come from the spouses’ own agreement. Child support may be modified under § 236(B)(9)(b)(2) for a substantial change in circumstances or, unless the parents opted out, after three years or a fifteen percent change in either parent’s gross income. A custody or parenting-time order may be changed where circumstances have changed and a change is in the child’s best interests. In Kings County, post-judgment applications are brought by order to show cause, must be personally served on the former spouse unless the court or the other side waives it, and must attach the judgment and agreement they concern. Where a contested judgment was signed within the prior eighteen months, the Supreme Court may hear a custody modification itself rather than send it to Family Court. Our page on modifying support and custody orders describes what a successful application contains.
The names and facts are fictional.
Grace and Victor’s judgment of divorce is signed in Kings County in November 2026. Grace’s settlement agreement, as § 255 requires, states that she understands she will no longer be covered by Victor’s employer health plan and may elect COBRA continuation. She enrolls in her own plan before the judgment is entered. Her judgment contains the § 240-a provision, and she resumes her former surname by presenting a certified copy at the Social Security office.
Grace’s will, signed during the marriage, left everything to Victor and named him executor. Under EPTL § 5-1.4, those provisions are revoked at judgment, and Victor is treated as having died before her. Her children take under the will’s alternate provisions. Her life insurance designation naming Victor is revoked as well. Her 401(k), however, is an employer plan governed by federal law, and the plan will pay the beneficiary on its form. During the divorce the automatic orders kept her from changing it. Now she files a new designation naming her children’s trust. Because the agreement requires Victor to keep $500,000 of life insurance for the children’s support until the youngest turns 21, Victor must re-designate the children’s trustee after the judgment, since any designation of Grace herself would be revoked. Grace then signs a new will, health care proxy, and power of attorney.
The following answers are self-contained and reflect New York law as of October 3, 2026. Additional questions are answered on our divorce and family law FAQ.
Is New York a 50/50 divorce state?
No. New York is an equitable distribution state. Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(c) requires marital property to be divided equitably, meaning fairly, after the court weighs sixteen statutory factors, including the length of the marriage, each spouse’s contributions, and any wasteful dissipation of assets. An equal division is common in long marriages, but the statute does not require it, and the court must state the reasons for whatever division it orders.
Can my spouse refuse to give me a divorce in New York?
No. Under Domestic Relations Law § 170(7), a divorce may be granted on one spouse’s sworn statement that the marriage has broken down irretrievably for at least six months. The other spouse’s consent is not required, and refusing to sign papers does not prevent the divorce. A spouse can contest the terms, such as property, support, and custody, and the judgment waits until those issues are resolved by agreement or by the court.
How long do we have to be separated to get divorced in New York?
You do not have to be separated at all to file on the no-fault ground, which requires only that the marriage has been irretrievably broken for six months. If you rely on a separation agreement or a judgment of separation under § 170(5) or (6), you must have lived apart for six months or more after it was signed or granted. Chapter 673 of the Laws of 2025 reduced that period from one year.
How much does a divorce cost in Brooklyn?
Court fees for an uncontested divorce total at least $335: $210 for the index number and $125 for the note of issue and request for judicial intervention, plus $45 per motion, $35 to file a settlement agreement, and $8 per certified copy of the judgment. Attorney’s fees are separate and depend on the hours the case requires. Under Domestic Relations Law § 237, the court may order the higher-earning spouse to pay the other’s counsel fees.
Do I have to go to court for a divorce in Brooklyn?
Usually not, if the divorce is uncontested. The papers are filed with the Kings County Supreme Court Matrimonial Office at 360 Adams Street, reviewed by that office, and signed by a justice without an appearance. A contested divorce requires an in-person preliminary conference, which both spouses must attend, and further conferences until the case settles or is tried. Many contested cases settle before trial.
How long does a divorce take in Brooklyn?
No statute sets a timetable, and the court does not publish one. An uncontested divorce depends on how quickly the spouses complete and file the papers and how long the Matrimonial Office takes to review them; our firm has found six to nine months to be a common range for cooperative couples. A contested divorce depends on financial disclosure and whether the spouses settle, and can take considerably longer.
How is child support calculated in New York in 2026?
Child support follows the Child Support Standards Act in Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b). The court applies a percentage to the parents’ combined income up to $193,000 as of March 1, 2026: 17 percent for one child, 25 for two, 29 for three, 31 for four, and at least 35 for five or more. Each parent pays a share proportional to income, plus shares of child care, health insurance, and unreimbursed medical costs. Support continues until the child turns 21.
How long does maintenance last in New York?
Post-divorce maintenance follows an advisory schedule in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)(f) based on the length of the marriage: 15 to 30 percent of the marriage’s length for marriages up to 15 years, 30 to 40 percent for 15 to 20 years, and 35 to 50 percent for marriages over 20 years. The court may depart from the schedule with stated reasons. Maintenance ends on the death of either spouse or the recipient’s remarriage.
Can I keep the apartment?
Possibly. Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(f) lets the court decide the use and occupancy of the marital home without regard to the form of ownership, so the court can award a rented apartment to one spouse as between the two of them, and a custodial parent’s need to stay in the home is one of the statutory factors. The court’s order does not bind the landlord, so whether you may remain on the lease is a separate question to raise early.
Can I date while my divorce is pending?
New York law does not prohibit it. Because marital property is divided without regard to fault, a new relationship rarely affects the financial outcome. It can matter in two ways: in a custody dispute, if the relationship affects the children, and in the property division, if marital funds are spent on a new partner, which the court may treat as wasteful dissipation under Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d)(12).
Can I go back to my maiden name after a divorce in New York?
Yes. Domestic Relations Law § 240-a requires every judgment of divorce to include a provision that each party may resume the use of his or her premarriage surname or any other former surname. No separate name-change proceeding is needed. A certified copy of the judgment, available from the Kings County Clerk, is the document government agencies and banks will ask for.
Will I lose my health insurance when I get divorced?
Coverage under your spouse’s plan usually ends at the judgment, which is why Domestic Relations Law § 255 requires the court to confirm that both spouses were notified of that possibility before it signs the judgment. During the case, the automatic orders keep existing coverage in place. After the judgment, continuation coverage may be available through COBRA, and where maintenance is awarded the court can order the paying spouse to maintain health insurance for the other.
This guide states the law of New York as it stands on October 3, 2026. The Domestic Relations Law changes, the Child Support Standards Chart and the maintenance income cap are revised every two years on March 1, and the Kings County matrimonial rules are updated from time to time. We review this guide after each of those events. It is general information for New York residents and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship, and no two cases are alike. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. Before you act on anything here, talk to a licensed New York attorney about your own facts.
Goldberg Sager & Associates has represented matrimonial clients from its office at 1628 Kings Highway, in the Midwood section of Brooklyn, since 1992. Karen Goldberg Sager heads the firm’s family law practice. Marcel A. Sager handles the estate, tax, and real estate matters that follow many divorces. We appear in the Supreme and Family Courts of Brooklyn, Queens, Manhattan, Staten Island, and the Bronx, and in Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, and Rockland Counties. To schedule a consultation with a Brooklyn divorce lawyer at our firm, call 718-645-6677.
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